Fingerprint data of the dead will not be shared, says UIDAI

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) and its policies on data sharing, particularly concerning the fingerprints of deceased individuals.

Key Themes:

• Restrictions on Data Sharing: The UIDAI operates under severe legal restrictions regarding the sharing of information, particularly biometric data.
• Technological Constraints: There are technological limitations in extracting specific information, such as identifying a deceased person using fingerprints from the Aadhaar database.
• Purpose of Aadhaar: The primary objective of the Aadhaar system is to provide unique identity and facilitate targeted delivery of government subsidies, benefits, and services.
• Confidentiality of Information: The Aadhaar Act mandates strict confidentiality of individual records.
• Specific Prohibition on Biometric Data Sharing: Core biometric information is explicitly prohibited from being shared for any reason other than Aadhaar generation and authentication.

Most Important Ideas/Facts:

• UIDAI will not share fingerprint data of the dead with the police. This is a direct statement from the UIDAI to the Madras High Court in response to a request from the State of Tamil Nadu.
• Technological limitations prevent the culling of information about the dead using fingerprints. The UIDAI explicitly states there are "technological constraints in culling out information about the dead using fingerprints."
• The Aadhaar Act, 2016 (as amended in 2019) imposes severe restrictions on sharing information. The Act is the legal basis for the UIDAI's limitations on data sharing.
• Core biometric information cannot be shared for any reason other than Aadhaar generation and authentication. Section 29(1) of the Act is cited as categorically stating this prohibition. The source quotes, "Section 29(1) of the Act categorically states that no core biometric information, collected or created under the Act, should be shared with anyone for any reason whatsoever; or used for any purpose other than generation of Aadhaar numbers and authentication under the Act."
• Aadhaar is not used to track other activities of the resident. A counter-affidavit signed by a UIDAI Deputy Director asserts that "Aadhaar number is not used to track other activities of the resident".
• The primary object of the Aadhaar Act is targeted delivery of government subsidies, benefits, and services. This highlights the intended purpose of the Aadhaar system.

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• Context and Implications:

• The sources highlight a specific legal and technical barrier to using the Aadhaar database for identifying deceased individuals based on their fingerprints. The UIDAI is emphasizing its adherence to the strict confidentiality and data sharing restrictions mandated by the Aadhaar Act. This position has implications for law enforcement agencies seeking to utilize the Aadhaar database for identification purposes in certain scenarios. The focus remains on the original objectives of the Act, which are primarily related to identity verification for the purpose of accessing government benefits and services.

1. Consider the following statements:

1. The UIDAI can share the fingerprint data of deceased individuals for police investigations if court-directed.

2. Section 29(1) of the Aadhaar Act prohibits sharing of core biometric information for any purpose other than Aadhaar generation and authentication.

3. The UIDAI functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Which of the above statements is/are correct?

A. 1 and 2 only
B. 2 only
C. 1 and 3 only
D. 2 and 3 only

Answer: B. 2 only

Explanation:

• Statement 1 is incorrect: UIDAI has stated that it cannot share fingerprint data of the deceased, even for police purposes, due to technological constraints and legal restrictions.

• Statement 2 is correct: Section 29(1) of the Aadhaar Act strictly prohibits sharing of core biometric data like fingerprints for any purpose other than Aadhaar generation or authentication.

• Statement 3 is incorrect: UIDAI functions under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY), not the Ministry of Home Affairs.

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2. Which of the following is the primary objective of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016?

A. To create a national criminal database using biometric data
B. To assist law enforcement agencies with biometric identification of unknown bodies
C. To empower residents with a unique identity for targeted delivery of government services
D. To provide access to national voting and citizenship records

Answer: C. To empower residents with a unique identity for targeted delivery of government services

Explanation:
The main purpose of the Aadhaar Act is to enable efficient and targeted delivery of subsidies, benefits, and services to Indian residents by assigning them a unique identity number (Aadhaar). It is not designed for criminal investigation or voter verification.

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3. With reference to UIDAI and the Aadhaar Act, consider the following:

1. The UIDAI is a statutory authority.

2. UIDAI can authenticate biometric data to provide demographic details to law enforcement.

3. The Aadhaar Act of 2016 was amended in 2019.

Which of the above statements is/are correct?

A. 1 and 2 only
B. 1 and 3 only
C. 2 and 3 only
D. 1, 2, and 3

Answer: B. 1 and 3 only

Explanation:

• Statement 1 is correct: UIDAI is a statutory authority established under the Aadhaar Act, 2016.

• Statement 2 is incorrect: UIDAI cannot provide biometric-based demographic information for police or law enforcement due to legal and technological restrictions.

• Statement 3 is correct: The Aadhaar Act was amended in 2019 to update several provisions.                                                                

  4. In the context of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, what does “core biometric information” include?

  A. Name and address
  B. Mobile number and photograph
  C. Fingerprints and iris scan
  D. Date of birth and gender

  Answer: C. Fingerprints and iris scan

  Explanation:
  According to the Aadhaar Act, core biometric information refers to fingerprints, iris scans, and any other biometric data specified by regulations. It excludes demographic details like name, address, and mobile number.

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  5. The Aadhaar Act, 2016 provides for which of the following regarding individual data protection?

  A. Data may be freely accessed by government agencies for national security.
  B. Core biometric data can be shared if it serves public interest.
  C. Core biometric data shall not be shared with anyone for any reason whatsoever.
  D. UIDAI may sell data to private companies with user consent.

  Answer: C. Core biometric data shall not be shared with anyone for any reason whatsoever

  Explanation:
  Section 29(1) of the Aadhaar Act strictly states that core biometric data shall not be shared with anyone for any reason. It also cannot be used for purposes other than generation and authentication of Aadhaar.

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  6. Which of the following best describes the UIDAI's legal stance regarding fingerprint matching of a deceased person with its Aadhaar database?

  A. Allowed under emergency provisions
  B. Permitted with a court order
  C. Prohibited due to legal and technological constraints
  D. Allowed for national security purposes only

  Answer: C. Prohibited due to legal and technological constraints

  Explanation:
  The UIDAI clarified to the Madras High Court that it is not technologically feasible to retrieve demographic data of the dead via fingerprints, and the Aadhaar Act prohibits such data sharing regardless of the situation.

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  7. Which of the following legal principles was highlighted by UIDAI in its affidavit to the Madras High Court?

  A. Right to speedy trial
  B. Protection against self-incrimination
  C. Confidentiality of biometric data
  D. Freedom of information

  Answer: C. Confidentiality of biometric data

  Explanation:
  UIDAI emphasized strict confidentiality, as required under Chapter VI of the Aadhaar Act. They cited Section 29(1), which prohibits sharing or using core biometric data for any purpose other than those specified under the Act.

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  8. Which of the following statements about UIDAI is/are correct?

  1. UIDAI is responsible for issuing Aadhaar numbers after collecting biometric and demographic data.

  2. It works under the administrative control of the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology.

  3. It is empowered to use Aadhaar data for law enforcement investigations.

  Select the correct answer using the code below:

  A. 1 and 2 only
  B. 2 and 3 only
  C. 1 and 3 only
  D. 1, 2, and 3

  Answer: A. 1 and 2 only

  Explanation:

  • Statement 1 is correct: UIDAI collects biometric and demographic data to issue a 12-digit Aadhaar number.

  • Statement 2 is correct: UIDAI operates under the Ministry of Electronics and IT.

  • Statement 3 is incorrect: UIDAI cannot use Aadhaar data for law enforcement, due to legal prohibitions and data confidentiality laws.

 

Should NOTA be included in all elections compulsorily? When was NOTA first introduced? What is the Election Commission’s position on NOTA? Sanjay Kumar The story so far: Recently, the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) for including NOTA as an option compulsorily in every election, even if there is only one single candidate. When was NOTA introduced? NOTA or the ‘None of the Above’ option was introduced in Indian elections for the first time in 2013 on the PIL filed by the People’s Union for Civil Liberties which sought a mechanism to “recognise the right of a voter not to vote, but still the secrecy of his having not voted is not maintained in its implementation...” Is NOTA relevant in Indian elections? It is true that not many voters have opted for NOTA during the last national election and the other subsequent State-level elections. However, not holding an election in a constituency because there is only one candidate, would mean denying voters the chance of expressing their opinion (through NOTA) against that single candidate who will anyhow get elected unopposed. The Election Commission (EC) has argued against NOTA stating that it has not brought in the desired results as not many voters have opted for NOTA in past elections. But one should not forget that NOTA is a way through which our electoral system can become more responsive to people. What is the EC’s argument? The EC is completely opposed to the idea of making NOTA a compulsory option in all constituencies even if there is only one candidate contesting the election. The Election Commission presented data that in all the Lok Sabha elections held since 1971, there have been only six uncontested elections. Another data point cited by the EC was that since 1952, there have been only nine cases of candidates getting elected unopposed. The EC’s lawyer said that, “the chance of election being uncontested has become a rarity which is also proven by statistical data; hence Supreme Court should not even entertain such a PIL”. They went on to argue that “treating NOTA as mandatorily contesting candidate in all direct uncontested elections does not find a place in the statues and same would require legislative amendments in the provisions of Representation of the People Act 1951, and the conduct of Election Rules 1961”. Since it is such a rarity, the EC should not have its hands full. If the EC can conduct elections in such a large number of constituencies given its resources, holding elections in constituencies, with a NOTA option, even if there is only one candidate, should not amount to a lot of additional work. Are NOTA voters a minority? It is true that looking in terms of per cent only little more than 1% of voters, voted for NOTA in the three Lok Sabha elections (2014, 2019 and 2024) held since NOTA was introduced. But given the size of the electorate in one Parliamentary constituency, each having on an average about 25 lakh voters, even these numbers are not small. There are many State assembly elections where little more than 1% opted for NOTA over the last decade, the highest being in Bihar with 2.48% during the 2015 Assembly election, followed by Gujarat with 1.8% during the 2017 Assembly elections. If one looks at the NOTA votes over the years in different States, one sees that it was slightly higher in the very first election held in the State after NOTA was introduced but declined in subsequent elections, although the trend is not linear. What next? Some reforms are needed. One can be by fixing the minimum per cent of votes to be polled by the candidate as a benchmark for getting elected depending upon the size of the constituency. The other method could be by giving legitimacy to NOTA votes and voters, by making a provision for re-election if certain percentage of voters opt for NOTA in an election. Sanjay Kumar is Professor and Co-director Lokniti-CSDS. THE GIST NOTA or the ‘None of the Above’ option was introduced in Indian elections for the first time in 2013. The EC is completely opposed to the idea of making NOTA a compulsory option in all constituencies even if there is only one candidate contesting the election. It is true that looking in terms of per cent only little more than 1% of voters, voted for NOTA in the three Lok Sabha elections (2014, 2019 and 2024) held since NOTA was introduced.

 

Q. Consider the following statements regarding NOTA (None of the Above) in Indian elections:

1. NOTA was introduced in Indian elections following a PIL filed by the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy.
2. The Election Commission of India supports making NOTA a compulsory option in all elections, including those with only one candidate.
3. The percentage of NOTA voters has remained consistently above 2% in all State Assembly elections since 2013.
4. NOTA was first introduced in Indian elections in the year 2013.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

A. 1 and 2 only
B. 4 only
C. 3 and 4 only
D. 2 and 3 only

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Correct Answer: B. 4 only

Explanation:

• Statement 1 is incorrect: The PIL that led to the introduction of NOTA in 2013 was filed by the People’s Union for Civil Liberties, not the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy.
• Statement 2 is incorrect: The Election Commission is opposed to making NOTA compulsory, even in single-candidate constituencies.
• Statement 3 is incorrect: NOTA voting has mostly remained a little over 1%, with only a few states (like Bihar in 2015) seeing up to 2.48%.
• Statement 4 is correct: NOTA was introduced in Indian elections in 2013.

 

 

Does Article 21 include right to digital access?

What approach does the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016 take? Why do banks and other financial and government institutions mandate collecting KYC details? How does the current digital KYC framework exclude visually impaired individuals and acid attack survivors?

On April 30, the Supreme Court (SC) directed revisions to Know-Your-Customer (KYC) digital norms to ensure accessibility for ‘persons with disabilities’ (PwD), reinterpreting Article 21 of the Constitution to encompass the ‘right to digital access’.

What laws safeguard rights of PwD?

The Constitution, through its Preamble, Fundamental Rights, and Directive Principles, alongside disability statutes, obligates the state to adapt laws, policies, and infrastructure which allow PwDs to exercise their rights on par with others. Advancing these guarantees and giving effect to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), India enacted the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016, which adopted a ‘social-barrier’ approach that defines disability as arising from impairments, along with physical, mental, intellectual, social, and psycho-social obstacles which make full participation in society difficult.

Crucially, Section 42 of the RPwD Act, 2016, mandates ‘government measures’ to ensure that all audio, print, and electronic media are accessible; that electronic media includes audio description, sign-language interpretation, and captions; and that everyday electronic goods and equipment follow ‘universal-design’ principles.

Are KYC details mandatory?

To curb illegal finance and money laundering, the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 (and its 2005 Rules) mandates every bank and financial institution to verify client identities, maintain comprehensive records, and report relevant information to the Financial Intelligence Unit. Consequently, digital KYC verification has become indispensable for a wide range of essential services — from opening a bank, demat or trading account to accessing SIM cards, pension schemes or insurance policies. It also unlocks government benefits — from national scholarships to Aadhaar-linked ‘direct benefit transfers’.

Building on this mandate, the RBI’s 2016 Master Direction on Know Your Customer (KYC) rules prescribe a Customer Due Diligence (CDD) framework and, via Clause 18, introduces Video-based Customer Identification Process (V-CIP), enabling remote customer verification through secure, real-time video interaction. Customers can prove their identity online by clicking a selfie; signing on a paper physically or digitally; printing and rescanning, or clicking a photo of the filled-in form; verifying OTPs in 30 seconds; and reading a random code flashed on the screen.

How does it affect PwDs?

Acid-attack survivors left with permanent ‘facial disfigurement’ and severe eye burns — and individuals with complete blindness or low vision — have filed writ petitions seeking directions to respondents, including RBI, the Department of Telecommunications and SEBI, to devise alternative digital KYC, e-KYC and video-KYC methods to make remote identity checks inclusive for all PwDs as they face significant hurdles under the current framework.

Currently, each ‘regulated entity’ has to devise its own tests. Methods such as eye-blinking, reading a flashing code, or writing it down and taking a selfie exclude blind users. Despite clear mandates in the 2021 and 2022 Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Accessibility Standards, most KYC apps and websites flout them — there is no screen-reader prompt for camera alignment, no audio cues for lighting or focus, and no way to differentiate document sides during upload. Additionally, thumb impressions, commonly used by visually impaired users, are not accepted as valid signatures, nor are PAN cards issued with them. Aadhaar-based biometric systems worsen the exclusion. Scanners and interfaces lack basic ‘accessibility’ features such as ‘text-to-speech’ or ‘self-verification’. As a result, blind applicants are frequently asked to appear in person or are rejected on vague technical grounds. The RBI’s Master Directions also bar any form of ‘prompting’ during KYC verification, leaving users without assistance.

How has the SC intervened?

The SC has consistently held that accessibility for PwDs is a ‘constitutional imperative’. In Rajive Raturi versus Union of India (2024), it ruled that ‘accessibility’ is central to the right to life, dignity, and freedom of movement under Article 21. During the COVID-19 vaccination drive, the court emphasised that digital registration must be fully accessible to prevent exclusion. In the instant case, the top court held that ‘digital barriers’ blatantly violate the rights of PwD under the UNCRPD and India’s disability laws. Anchoring its judgment in the principle of ‘substantive equality’, it directed that digital KYC guidelines be revised with ‘accessibility’ at their core. It flagged that the digital divide affects not just PwDs, but rural users, senior citizens, the economically disadvantaged, and linguistic minorities.

Relying on Articles 14, 15, 21, and 38, the court affirmed that ‘digital access’ is inseparable from the ‘right to life and liberty’. It mandated the state to ensure that all digital infrastructure is accessible, especially for marginalised communities.

Kartikey Singh is a lawyer based in New Delhi.

THE GIST

To curb illegal finance and money laundering, the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 (and its 2005 Rules) mandates every bank and financial institution to verify client identities, maintain comprehensive records, and report relevant information to the Financial Intelligence Unit.

Methods such as eye-blinking, reading a flashing code, or writing it down and taking a selfie exclude blind users.

The SC has consistently held that accessibility for PwDs is a ‘constitutional imperative’.

Questions Based on above 

Q1. Consider the following statements regarding Article 21 of the Indian Constitution:

1. Article 21 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty.
2. The Supreme Court has interpreted Article 21 to include the right to digital access.
3. Article 21 includes the right to education and the right to die.

Which of the above statements is/are correct?

A. 1 only
B. 1 and 2 only
C. 2 and 3 only
D. 1, 2 and 3

Answer: B. 1 and 2 only

Explanation:

• Article 21 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty (True).
• Recently, the Supreme Court reinterpreted Article 21 to include the right to digital access, especially for persons with disabilities (True).
• However, the right to die is not recognized under Article 21; only passive euthanasia is conditionally permitted. Hence, statement 3 is incorrect.

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Q2. The Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016 adopts which of the following approaches to disability?

A. Charity-based approach
B. Medical model of disability
C. Social-barrier model
D. Welfare model

Answer: C. Social-barrier model

Explanation:
The RPwD Act, 2016 adopts a social-barrier model, recognizing that disability arises not just from impairments but also from physical, social, and attitudinal barriers that hinder full participation in society.

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Q3. Section 42 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 deals with:

A. Reservation in jobs for PwDs
B. Accessibility of media and electronic goods
C. Educational rights for children with disabilities
D. Provision of aids and appliances

Answer: B. Accessibility of media and electronic goods

Explanation:
Section 42 mandates that audio, print, and electronic media be accessible and requires universal design for electronic goods to ensure usability for persons with disabilities.

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Q4. Which of the following is NOT a reason why current KYC frameworks are exclusionary for visually impaired individuals?

A. No screen-reader prompts for camera alignment
B. PAN cards do not support thumb impressions
C. Biometric systems accept all fingerprints and iris scans equally
D. Rules bar assistance or prompting during video-KYC

Answer: C. Biometric systems accept all fingerprints and iris scans equally

Explanation:

• Current biometric systems often lack accessibility features like audio guidance and are difficult to use for those with visual impairments.
• Thus, C is incorrect because these systems are not equally accessible. The other statements (A, B, D) are all valid issues raised in the article.

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Q5. Which of the following constitutional articles were invoked by the Supreme Court in recognizing the right to digital access for PwDs?

1. Article 14
2. Article 15
3. Article 21
4. Article 38

Select the correct answer using the code below:

A. 1 and 3 only
B. 1, 2 and 3 only
C. 1, 2, 3 and 4
D. 2 and 4 only

Answer: C. 1, 2, 3 and 4

Explanation:
The Supreme Court relied on:

• Article 14 (Equality before law),
• Article 15 (Prohibition of discrimination),
• Article 21 (Right to life and liberty), and
• Article 38 (Directive Principles for promoting welfare of people)
  to uphold digital accessibility as a constitutional right.

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Q6. What was the Supreme Court’s primary reasoning for directing revision of the digital KYC guidelines?

A. To increase financial inclusion among all citizens
B. To reduce burden on telecom companies
C. To uphold substantive equality and accessibility for PwDs
D. To encourage private sector innovation in biometric systems

Answer: C. To uphold substantive equality and accessibility for PwDs

Explanation:
The Court found that the current digital KYC system excludes PwDs, violating the principle of substantive equality. It directed that accessibility must be at the core of digital infrastructure.