The India-Pakistan Standoff - Shifting to the Maritime Theatre

 

The India-Pakistan Standoff - Shifting to the Maritime Theatre

The recent escalation between India and Pakistan has moved beyond the land and air domains, with the naval arena emerging as a new and potentially more dangerous flashpoint.

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1. Why in the News?

Following the aerial standoff of Operation Sindoor (May 2025), both India and Pakistan are engaged in significant naval posturing, capability demonstrations, and strategic signaling in the Arabian Sea. This indicates a recalibration of their military doctrines, with the maritime theatre poised to play a central role in any future conflict.

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2. Key Terminology & Concepts

• NOTAM (Notice to Airmen/Mariners): A notice filed with an aviation or maritime authority to alert aircraft/ships of potential hazards along a route or at a location. Overlapping NOTAMs by India and Pakistan indicate competing military exercises and create operational friction.

• Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD): A military strategy to control access to and movement within a specific region, making it too costly for an adversary to operate. Pakistan is developing this to deter the Indian Navy.

• Deterrence-by-Denial: A strategy aimed at convincing an adversary that an attack will fail, thereby deterring them from initiating it. This is Pakistan's stated naval doctrine post-1971.

• Escalation Ladder: A conceptual model of the sequence of steps in a conflict, from low-level tensions to full-scale war. Naval engagements are considered high on this ladder.

• PLAN: The People's Liberation Army Navy (China). Its presence in Pakistani ports (Karachi, Gwadar) is a key strategic concern for India.

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3. Drivers of the Maritime Shift

A. Indian Posturing and Strategy:

1. Forward Deterrence: Operation Sindoor was designed with a "naval forward deterrent posture," indicating a more proactive role for the navy.

2. Strong Rhetoric: Defence Minister Rajnath Singh's warning of a "resounding response" in the Sir Creek area signals a readiness to retaliate decisively in the maritime domain.

3. Capacity Building & Alliances: Induction of INS Nistar (diving vessel) and joint patrols with the Philippines in the South China Sea demonstrate a push for enhanced capability and alignment with a broader Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China-Pakistan cooperation.

B. Pakistani Counter-Measures and Modernization:

1. Dispersal of Assets: Moving assets from Karachi to Gwadar to mitigate vulnerability to a pre-emptive strike.

2. Fleet Modernization: Induction of Chinese-built Hangor-class submarines and showcasing of the indigenous P282 ship-launched ballistic missile.

3. Signaling Readiness: Conducting missile tests and live-fire drills close to Indian NOTAMs to demonstrate its navy is no longer the vulnerable force of 1971.

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4. Strategic Implications & Challenges

A. The Narrowing Capability Gap:

• While India retains a numerical and geographical advantage, its fleet is aging.

• Pakistan is steadily modernizing with Chinese and Turkish platforms (e.g., Babur-class corvettes), equipped with advanced radar, EW suites, and potent weaponry.

• This is eroding India's assumption of uncontested dominance in the northern Indian Ocean.

B. Higher Risks of Escalation:

• Crossing the War Threshold: Unlike calibrated aerial skirmishes, any naval engagement (e.g., ship-on-ship) is perceived as a major act of war, making escalation control far more difficult.

• The 1971 Ghost: For Pakistan, the memory of the Indian Navy's decisive role in blockading East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) makes any Indian naval action an existential threat, prompting a potentially disproportionate response.

C. The Complicating External Dimension:

• China's Shadow: The strategic presence of the PLAN at Karachi and Gwadar under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) raises the specter of direct Chinese involvement in a future conflict, fundamentally altering India's strategic calculus.

• Turkey's Role: Turkey's emerging role as a defense supplier to Pakistan adds another layer of complexity.

D. The Coercion Dilemma:

• India's previous playbook of using naval deployments to impose psychological costs without triggering escalation (e.g., forcing Pakistan to disperse its fleet) may no longer work.

• There is now a paradox: the coercive options are narrowing due to Pakistan's A2/AD capabilities, but the domestic pressure to use naval power is increasing.

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5. Probable UPSC Questions

A. Prelims (Factual)

1. The term 'A2/AD', recently seen in the context of India-Pakistan relations, stands for:
   a) Air-to-Air Detection
   b) Anti-Access/Area Denial
   c) Advanced Armament and Defence
   d) Allied Assistance and Deployment
   Answer: b) Anti-Access/Area Denial

2. Consider the following statements regarding the recent maritime developments between India and Pakistan:

   1. Pakistan has launched the Chinese-built Hangor-class submarines.

   2. India has conducted its first joint naval patrols with the Philippines in the South China Sea.

   3. The strategic port of Gwadar is a key node in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

   How many of the statements given above are correct?
   a) Only one
   b) Only two
   c) All three
   d) None
   Answer: c) All three

B. Mains GS (Analytical)

GS Paper II (International Relations)

1. "The maritime theatre is becoming the new strategic frontline in India-Pakistan relations." Critically analyze this statement in the context of recent developments.

2. The external dimension, particularly the role of China, has fundamentally altered the India-Pakistan maritime balance. Discuss.

GS Paper III (Security)

1. Compare and contrast the risks of escalation in the aerial and maritime domains in the context of India-Pakistan conflict. Why is escalation control far harder at sea?

C. Interview

• "How should India navigate the strategic dilemma where its traditional naval dominance in the Arabian Sea is being challenged by the China-Pakistan nexus?"

• "In your opinion, does a stronger Indian Navy contribute to regional stability or lead to a more volatile security environment?"

• "What lessons from the 1971 naval operations remain relevant today, and which ones need to be updated?"

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