Disasters Test More Than Infrastructure — They Test Federalism

The Wayanad landslides of July 2024 are no longer just a tragic memory of lost lives — they have become a mirror reflecting an uncomfortable truth:

India’s fiscal federalism appears to be shifting
from cooperation to permission,
from partnership to negotiation.

Despite losses worth ₹2,200 crore, Kerala received only ₹260 crore — a mere 11%.
This mismatch is not just a number —
it is a warning.

Disasters are supposed to unify governments.
Instead, they are now revealing widening cracks.

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🏛️ A Framework Designed for Partnership…

…but Practised as Permission

The Disaster Management Act, 2005, created:

• SDRF → joint fund for immediate relief

• NDRF → Union-funded support for “severe” disasters

On paper — shared responsibility
In practice — centralised control

Where cooperation was promised,
Discretion has emerged.

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🔹 Four Cracks in the System

1️⃣ Relief norms frozen in time

• ₹4 lakh for death

• ₹1.2 lakh for a fully damaged house

These numbers insult the cost of rebuilding a life.

2️⃣ What is a ‘severe disaster’?
→ Undefined
→ Applied selectively
→ Decided politically
→ Delayed strategically

3️⃣ Aid is not triggered — it is requested

• States must plead → assess → justify → wait

• The process moves
  When urgency has already died

4️⃣ Finance Commission formulas misread risk

• Population > rainfall

• Geography > landslide zones

• Poverty > hazard exposure

Allocations miss where danger lives.

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💔 Wayanad: A Case Study in Institutional Failure

The Centre refused higher aid because:

• Kerala had ₹780 crore unspent SDRF balance

• It previously received a ₹529 crore loan

But these “balances” are often:

• Committed but unspent

• Held back due to late fund release

• Reserved because States cannot rebuild using SDRF

So Kerala was blamed for following the rules.

When compliance is punished,
the system becomes a paradox.

Even the classification of Wayanad as “severe” was delayed —
limiting access to NDRF when lives depended on speed.

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💡 What Other Countries Do Better

Country	Trigger Type	Key Feature
U.S. (FEMA)	Per capita damage indicators	Mathematical objectivity
Mexico (FONDEN)	Rainfall/wind thresholds	Automatic disbursement
Philippines	Rainfall + fatality indices	Quick response
African & Caribbean insurance pools	Satellite-based loss	Rapid payouts
Australia	State relief spending ratio	Shared accountability

Their model: Data > Discretion
India’s model: Approval > Action

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🧭 What India Must Do — Before the Next Storm

• Update relief norms to present-day rebuilding costs

• Replace discretion with objective triggers

  • Rainfall intensity, fatalities/million population

  • Loss-to-GSDP ratio

• Use a scientific vulnerability index

• Ensure funds are grant-based, not loans

• Union should post-audit, not pre-approve

• Empower States to lead response and recovery

This is not anti-Centre
This is pro-citizen

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✨ A Federalism that Shows Up When It Matters

Disasters do not negotiate.
Aid should not either.

If States must beg for support —
Federalism has already failed.

“Disasters expose not only physical fault lines,
but constitutional ones too.”

The Constitution envisioned shared duty,
not central largesse.

The tragedy of Wayanad is therefore more than a natural disaster —
it is a democratic caution:

Federalism that functions only in sunshine
is no federalism at all.

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📝 UPSC GS-II / GS-III Mains Use

Question:
“India’s disaster financing framework is shifting from cooperative federalism to conditional federalism.”
Analyse with reference to the Wayanad landslides.

Answer pointers:

• Introduce with data (11% aid vs need)

• Discuss central discretion + outdated norms

• Compare global best practices

• Suggest reforms led by the Finance Commission

• Conclude with cooperative federalism as a constitutional obligation